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The economic boom of the USA in the 1990s was remarkable in its duration, the 
sustained rise in equipment investment, the reduced volatility of productivity 
growth, and continued uncertainty about the trend growth rate. In this paper we 
link these phenomena using an extension of the classic model of implementation 
cycles due to Shleifer (1986). The key idea is that uncertainty about the trend 
growth rate can lead firms to bring forward the implementation of innovations, 
temporarily eliminating expectations-driven business cycles, because delay is risky 
when beliefs are not common knowledge. 
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1. Introduction 
The macroeconomic record of the USA in the 1990s was remarkable in a number of 
ways. The media attention given to the Internet companies has tended to obscure 
the genuine achievements of the wider economy, including faster productivity 
growth, a rise in equipment investment, a reduction in output volatility, and an 
expansion that was sustained for exactly ten years – one of the longest on record. 
Although predictions of the ‘death’ or ‘taming’ of the business cycle were 
premature, there is strong evidence that the volatility of output has been declining 
since at least the mid-1980s (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). 
 
Another aspect of the New Economy is somewhat paradoxical, and has been less 
widely noted. Despite the stability of output growth, there was great uncertainty 
about whether this growth could be sustained, linked to uncertainty about the trend 
growth rate. As the duration of the boom exceeded all expectations, forecasters 
revised their predictions repeatedly, as we document further below. This makes the 
1990s an atypical period: unusually stable output growth was combined with a high 
degree of uncertainty about the trend growth rate. 
 
In this paper we interpret these stylized facts in the light of a classic model of 
business cycles due to Shleifer (1986). The starting point for Shleifer’s analysis is that 
firms must decide whether to implement innovations immediately, or wait for a 
period of higher aggregate demand. As well as an equilibrium in which firms 
implement immediately, there can also exist multiple short-cycle equilibria, and 
sometimes also longer cycles. The cycle is entirely driven by expectations about the 
timing of a boom. 
 
Recent work on expectations and multiple equilibria in macroeconomics has tended 
to emphasize the fragility of multiplicity results. With this in mind, we extend 
Shleifer’s model to incorporate the possibility of uncertainty about the underlying 
growth rate. We will show that this uncertainty can eliminate cyclical equilibria,  2
leaving immediate implementation as the only possible outcome. In Shleifer’s 
model, such an outcome would tend to be associated with unusually stable 
productivity growth, and a reduction in the volatility of investments associated with 
implementation. These are arguably features of the American boom of the 1990s, as 
we will discuss below.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a more 
detailed review of stylized facts about the New Economy, helping to motivate our 
extension of Shleifer’s model. In section 3, we provide an overview of 
implementation cycles, emphasizing the role of expectations. Section 4 sets out the 
basic framework, before section 5 shows that uncertainty about the underlying 
growth rate leads to immediate implementation. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Some stylized facts 
 
In this section of the paper, we discuss evidence that is consistent with the model of 
business cycles due to Shleifer (1986), and that will inform and motivate our later 
theoretical analysis. We are especially interested in evidence that supports a central 
result of Shleifer’s model. In his model, even when inventions arrive evenly over 
time, they are implemented in waves. The waves arise because firms have an 
incentive to defer implementation until aggregate demand is relatively high. 
  
We first ask whether there is evidence to support the idea that new ideas are 
implemented with delays, and in waves. We review previous research, and also 
provide some new (though indirect) evidence, by examining the behaviour of IPOs 
and MFP growth over the business cycle. We will argue that the cyclical patterns of 
these variables support the idea that innovations take place in waves.  
 
More direct evidence on this point is hard to obtain. Survey-based counts of the 
successful commercialisation of inventions sometimes reveal a pattern of distinct  3
peaks and troughs, as pointed out by Van Reenen (1996, p.219) using the data set for 
the UK described in Robson, Townsend and Pavitt (1988). This does not establish, 
however, that innovation clustering is the outcome of strategic delays.  
 
In this respect, some interesting evidence is provided by the behaviour of stock 
markets in the wake of technological changes. Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) explain 
major changes in US stock market valuations in terms of a delay between the 
creation of new technologies (such as information and communications 
technologies) and their implementation by new entrants. They argue that the 
potential of new technologies may be widely known several years before the 
technologies are implemented. This helps to explain the substantial decline in US 
stock valuations in the 1970s, given declines in expected profitability for incumbents 
and the market’s rational anticipation of entrants exploiting new technologies. This 
evidence is consistent with the view that implementation of new ideas involves 
delays, perhaps because entrepreneurs await favourable economic conditions. 
 
In exploring this idea in more detail, we focus mainly on US time series for 
movements in multifactor productivity (MFP) and initial public offerings (IPOs). We 
use both of these as proxies for the extent of innovative activity in the economy. We 
will be able to show that, especially after 1980, these two alternative measures tend 
to fluctuate in similar ways. Furthermore, the extent of volatility in each was lower 
in the 1990s than previously, consistent with our claim that clustering of innovations 
has diminished. 
 
First of all, figure 1 plots MFP growth in the USA, for the private non-farm business 
sector, between 1960 and 2001.1 This shows the well-known tendency for marked 
year-to-year variation in MFP growth. This variation may reflect simply the random 
nature of technical progress. There could be sufficient randomness in the creation of 
new ideas that MFP growth varies substantially from year to year, even if  4
implementation of a new idea is always immediate.2 An alternative view attributes 
the variation in MFP growth to measurement error of various kinds. Business cycles 
may be associated with systematic changes in measured MFP, notably through 
variation in factor utilization. Measured MFP growth will then vary at short 
horizons even when underlying technical progress follows a smooth path and new 
ideas are implemented without delay. 
 
Figure 1 – Annual data on MFP growth, non-farm private business 

























Notes: This table shows annual data on MFP growth for the nonfarm private business sector, calculated 
from BLS data. See Appendix 1 for more information on the data. 
 
Given these limitations of data on MFP growth, we combine this information with a 
more direct indicator of implementation, namely the number of initial public 
offerings (IPOs). Although IPOs vary in nature, a substantial fraction are clearly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 The MFP growth series is constructed from Bureau of Labor Statistics data on MFP levels. See the data 
appendix for the data sources. 
2 The main problem for this view is that it does not explain the significant positive autocorrelation seen 
in MFP growth, unless there are major technological shocks that have an economy-wide impact 
sustained over several years. As sometimes discussed in the real business cycle literature, it is not clear 
that innovations are sufficiently pervasive to generate the cyclical patterns seen in the aggregate data 
(see for example Stadler 1994).  5
motivated by the desire to raise capital in the course of implementing a new 
business idea. Pástor and Veronesi (2005) note that around two-thirds of the leaders 
of IPOs cite the raising of capital as the main reason for an offering. Moreover, 
capital growth in the two years around the IPO is substantially higher than for 
comparable firms. 
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Notes: This table shows annual data on IPOs for the US economy, using data collected by Jay Ritter. See 
Appendix 1 for more details. 
 
As with MFP growth, there is significant variation from year to year in the number 
of IPOs. There is also a tendency for IPOs to cluster together in distinct waves. Both 
the year-to-year variation and the tendency for significant autocorrelation are 
apparent in figure 2, which plots annual data on the number of IPOs in the USA 
since 1960 (see Appendix 1 for the source of these data). At first glance, this supports 
a story in which entrepreneurs are willing to defer bringing an idea to the market. 
 
Again, there are several possible explanations for the observed waves in IPOs. These 
include the possibility that entrepreneurs wish to take advantage of mispricing in  6
equity markets. As Pástor and Veronesi (2005) argue, it is not clear why the 
mispricing is clear to entrepreneurs but less readily observable to other market 
participants. Their preferred explanation is that the decision to go public can be seen 
as exercising a real option. Entrepreneurs might wish to delay an IPO, exercising the 
option only when there is a favourable change in market conditions. They present 
evidence that movements in expected aggregate profitability, including revisions to 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, are one determinant of the timing of IPOs. This 
endogeneity in the timing of investment can be seen as a specific instance of the 
general argument in Shleifer (1986). 
 
Figure 3 – The co-movement of IPOs and MFP growth 



































Notes: This table shows the co-movements of annual data on MFP growth for the private nonfarm 
business sector, and annual IPOs. See Appendix 1 for data sources. 
 
If we see MFP growth and the number of IPOs as two alternative measures of the 
level of innovative activity in the economy, it is natural to ask whether the two are 
closely related. Figure 3 combines the annual data on IPOs (in logarithms) with that 
on MFP growth. The correspondence between the two is weak for the 1960s and 
1970s, but greatly strengthens thereafter, with a slight tendency for IPOs to 
anticipate movements in MFP growth. This relationship is stronger when we restrict  7
attention to MFP growth in the manufacturing sector, disaggregated into durables 
and non-durables. Figures 4 (for non-durables) and 5 (for durables) again reveal the 
tendency for IPOs (for the whole economy) and MFP growth to move together after 
1980. 
 
Figure 4 – Annual MFP growth (manufacturing, non-durables) and log IPOs 
 
Annual MFP growth (manufacturing, non-durables)































Notes: This table shows the co-movements of annual data on MFP growth for the non-durables 
manufacturing sector, and annual IPOs. See Appendix 1 for data sources. 
 
The visual impression is confirmed by two further ways of looking at the data. First, 
we report simple correlations between MFP growth and lagged IPOs. Second, we 
will show that the number of IPOs helps to forecast MFP growth, even when 
conditioning on past MFP growth rates.  8
Figure 5 – Annual MFP growth (manufacturing, durables) and log IPOs 
Annual MFP growth (manufacturing, durables)
































Notes: This table shows the co-movements of annual data on MFP growth for the durables 
manufacturing sector, and annual IPOs. See Appendix 1 for data sources. 
 
Table 1 shows the correlations between MFP growth and lagged IPOs for the whole 
period (1963-2001) and for the subperiod 1980-2001. Given the likely measurement 
error in MFP growth, and the various influences on decisions to go public, the 
contemporaneous correlation for the post-1980 data is surprisingly high at 0.63. 
There is also some evidence that MFP growth is correlated with past numbers of 
IPOs, especially for the post-1980 period. 
 
We now carry out simple Granger-causality tests, by regressing annual MFP growth 
on two lags of MFP growth and one lag of the number of IPOs. We test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient on lagged IPOs is equal to zero, using Newey-West 
standard errors to construct our test statistics.3 The results are shown in Table 2. For 
the whole period, IPOs help to forecast MFP growth only in the durables 
manufacturing sector (the zero restriction is not rejected in the other two cases). For 
                                                           
3 For these test statistics to have their standard limiting distributions, the series must be stationary. For 
the various MFP growth series, we can easily reject the null of a unit root under a range of assumptions, 
using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. For the IPO series, the results are slightly less clear-cut, but DF-
GLS tests reject the null at the 10% level for a wide range of lag choices.  9
the period after 1980, however, the IPO series helps to forecast all three MFP growth 
series (business, durables manufacturing, and non-durables manufacturing). 
 
Table 1 – Correlations between MFP growth and lagged IPOs 
 
      
1963-2001      
  IPO(t-3) IPO(t-2) IPO(t-1) IPO(t) 
Business MFP(t)  0.14  -0.02  -0.00  0.10    
  (0.39) (0.89) (0.98) (0.53)   
Durables MPF(t)  0.30  0.25  0.46 0.39 
  (0.07) (0.13) (0.00) (0.01) 
Non-durables MFP(t)  -0.16 -0.08 0.14  0.24 
  (0.34) (0.62) (0.39) (0.13) 
      
1980-2001      
      
Business MFP(t)  0.37  0.29 0.34 0.63    
  (0.09) (0.19) (0.12) (0.00)   
Durables MPF(t)  0.28 0.29 0.71  0.46    
  (0.21) (0.20) (0.00) (0.03)   
Non-durables MFP(t)  -0.18 0.20  0.49  0.46    
  (0.43) (0.37) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
Notes. This table shows correlations between three MFP growth series (row) and IPOs in different 
periods (column) using annual data. Data sources are described in Appendix 1. Figures in parentheses 
are significance levels. Correlations significantly different from zero at the 10% level are shown in bold.  10
Table 2 – Do IPOs help to predict future MFP growth? 
 
 
Regression  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sector  Business  Nondur Durables  Business  Nondur Durables 
Time period  1961-2001  1980-2001 
Observations  41 41 41 22 22 22 
        
Constant 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
MFPG(t-1)  0.17 0.40**  0.22 -0.28  0.20 -0.04 
  (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) 
MFPG(t-2)  -0.06 -0.41 -0.22 0.10  -0.38 0.18 
  (0.19) (0.22) (0.15) (0.25) (0.22) (0.13) 
IPO(t-1)  -0.02 0.08  0.37* 0.33* 0.27* 0.59** 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16) (0.10) (0.14) 
        
R2  0.03 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.37 0.53 
LM(1)  0.85 0.43 0.49 0.66 0.70 0.23 
LM(2)  0.53 0.69 0.45 0.50 0.26 0.46 
Lagged  IPO  0.85 0.36 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 
 
Notes. Dependent variable: MFP growth, MFPG. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Newey-West 
standard errors in parentheses, corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation up to two lags. 
LM(n) is the p-value for a Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation, where the null hypothesis is 
no serial correlation of order n. “Lagged IPO” is the p-value for the null that lagged IPOs have a zero 
coefficient, based on Newey-West standard errors. For presentation of the results, the IPO series is 
rescaled by dividing by 10000.  
 
 
This result is not necessarily surprising, given that IPOs are inherently forward-
looking, and we do not intend to claim that we have identified a causal effect. We 
are interested in these correlations for the more general relationship that is revealed: 
the extent to which IPOs and MFP growth fluctuate in similar ways over the 
business cycle. Their co-movements support the idea of distinct waves of 
innovations, initially reflected in the observed timing of IPOs and subsequently in 
MFP growth. 
 
We now turn to a further set of stylized facts, related to a central argument of our 
paper. We will argue that implementation cycles were weakened in the 1990s, and 
replaced by a tendency for innovations to be implemented rapidly rather than  11
deferred to better times. This shows how Shleifer’s model might be used to interpret 
the stylized facts of the New Economy period. Although a direct test of this 
hypothesis is hard to implement, we can at least examine whether the aggregate 
data are consistent with weaker implementation cycles.4 
 
It is well known that the 1990s were a period of unusual stability for the US 
economy, as documented in McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Blanchard and 
Simon (2001) among others. To the extent that implementation is now smoother and 
less subject to distinct waves, we would expect to see reduced volatility in our 
proxies for implementation, namely MFP growth and IPOs. Figure 6 plots a 5-year 
rolling standard deviation of MFP growth in the private non-farm business sector. 
 
Figure 7 restricts attention to the volatility of MFP growth in the manufacturing 
sector, disaggregated into durables and non-durables, using a 9-year rolling 
standard deviation for each series. Figure 8 plots a rolling standard deviation for 
IPOs, again using a 9-year rolling standard deviation. All three figures reveal the 
same pattern, namely a clear reduction in volatility over the course of the 1990s, 
before an increase as the boom finally draws to a close. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we will present a theoretical argument that could 
explain this reduced volatility. The argument relies on uncertainty over the 
underlying rate of productivity growth, which can eliminate the multiplicity of 
equilibria obtained by Shleifer. At first sight, our argument might appear to be on 
unsafe ground, because superficially the 1990s were a period of stability rather than 
uncertainty. Here, however, the distinction between volatility and predictability is 
crucial. It is well known that a series can be volatile but predictable, but in the 1990s 
the reverse obtained. The New Economy period was one in which major 
macroeconomic variables were unusually stable, to an extent that caught out many 
                                                           
4 Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000, p. 158) note a shortening in the product cycle of microprocessors, with 
new processors brought to market more quickly in the 1990s than previously. This may reflect, 
however, an acceleration in technical change rather than an elimination of implementation lags.  12
observers. Moreover, since growth consistently exceeded expectations, there was 
speculation that trend growth had increased, and disagreement over the extent to 
which this had happened. 
 
Figure 6 – The declining volatility of MFP growth 






































Notes: the plotted value at date T is the five-year rolling standard deviation of annual MFP growth in 
the private nonfarm business sector, using data from year T-4 to year T. See Appendix 1 for data 
sources. 
 
As stated by Robert Hall in his comments on Blanchard and Simon (2001), five-year 
and ten-year forecast errors for the US economy were unusually large in the 1990s. 
Much the same point is made in Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000, p. 162-165). They note 
that forecasters repeatedly had to raise growth projections, and that the 
Congressional Budget Office revised forecasts of TFP growth upwards on a number 
of occasions. The uncertainty arose partly because the 1990s expansion was 
sustained to an unusual extent, making it harder to rely on past cycles as a guide. 
  13
Figure 7 – The declining volatility of MFP growth in manufacturing 
9-year rolling standard deviation of annual MFP growth






































Notes: the plotted values at date T are the nine-year rolling standard deviation of the two MFP growth 
series using data from year T-8 to year T. See Appendix 1 for data sources. 
 
 
Figure 8 – The declining volatility of IPOs 
Notes: the plotted value at date T is the nine-year standard deviation of the annual IPO series using 
data from year T-8 to year T.  
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The combination of a sustained expansion, and a massive stock market boom, led to 
wide discussion of the possibility that trend growth had increased, in both the 
business press and more academic commentary. Views differed, indicating the 
uncertainty even among close observers. In reviewing productivity growth in the 
1990s, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) argued that there was a case for an upwards 
revision of medium-term growth forecasts. In contrast, Gordon, in his comments on 
the same paper, argued that some of the productivity gains of 1995-99 were likely to 
prove transient, and that the reputation of the New Economy had been inflated by 
cyclical factors. More recently, productivity growth appears to have grown strongly 
even in the 2001 recession, another departure from previous cyclical patterns. 
 
As noted by Sichel in his commentary on Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), the 
decomposition of output growth into trend and cyclical effects is particularly 
difficult when the length and nature of an expansion has departed so sharply from 
previous norms. Stiroh (1999), in discussing the possibility of a rise in trend growth, 
argued that conclusions would have to await new evidence. Combined, the lack of 
consensus illustrates the uncertainty about the trend growth rate that was an 
important feature of the late 1990s. 
 
The theoretical analysis in the remainder of the paper will explain why uncertainty 
of this kind could have implications for Shleifer’s explanation of business cycles. 
Although it may seem paradoxical at first sight, the Shleifer model can explain the 
unusual stability of the 1990s, if we appeal to contemporaneous uncertainty about 
the underlying trend growth rate. 
 
3. Implementation  cycles 
 
In this section, we provide an overview of the arguments in the remainder of the 
paper. The arguments build on a long tradition in macroeconomics, emphasizing the 
importance of expectations and beliefs for macroeconomic behaviour. This has been  15
stressed at least since Keynes (1936) argued that "animal spirits" may give rise to 
instability. Expectations of booms and recessions can be self-fulfilling, as agents 
bring forward or postpone their investment decisions, depending on their 
perceptions of how the economy will evolve in the future. If some firms anticipate 
an increase in aggregate demand, they may decide not to invest in the present 
period and delay their investment to some future date. This will enable those firms 
to maximize the revenue from their sales during a boom. If other firms in the 
economy share the same expectations about future demand, they will also postpone 
their investment to the future. This will bring about a recession in the current period 
and a boom at a later date. 
 
Based on this kind of intuition, there is now a large literature on self-fulfilling 
prophecies, stemming from the theoretical analyses of Azariadis (1981) and Cass and 
Shell (1983), and surveyed by Farmer (1993), Matsuyama (1995) and Silvestre (1993). 
Many of these models imply that, under some conditions, there are several possible 
outcomes or even a continuum of equilibria. 
 
The practical relevance of multiplicity has been questioned by examining the role of 
higher order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). Recent contributions emphasize that 
certain equilibria will be observed only under restrictive assumptions on the 
informational structure of the economy.5 Coordination on certain equilibria often 
requires an assumption that agents have common knowledge about the 
fundamentals of the economy and about the beliefs (of all orders) of the other 
agents. In particular, the expectations of all the agents in the economy should be 
common knowledge, in the technical sense of that term. 
 
                                                           
5 The fragility of some equilibria in the presence of uncertainty and correlated signals has been analyzed 
by several authors in different contexts. Shin (1995) considers a decentralized economy with search 
externalities. Morris and Shin (1998) look at the timing of speculative attacks against a currency. 
Scaramozzino and Vulkan (2004) examine a model of local oligopoly with correlated noise about the 
competitive advantage of firms. See Morris and Shin (2000, 2003) for details of more applications, 
especially to macroeconomic issues.    16
This is clearly an unrealistic assumption to make in macroeconomic models. A more 
satisfactory assumption is that agents have imperfect knowledge of the 
fundamentals of the economy and of the beliefs held by everybody else. Their beliefs 
may still be related to those of other agents:  individuals can learn about the 
information and beliefs of others, simply by observing their actions. Furthermore, 
they share access to public information. The key point, however, is that the beliefs of 
all agents are unlikely to be common knowledge. 
 
This apparently minor change in assumptions has dramatic implications. Imagine 
that agents receive noisy signals about the same key parameter, and the noise 
affecting the signal is idiosyncratic so that agents’ signals may be different. In this 
case, and under quite general conditions, agents will select what they perceive to be 
their least risky course of action. As a consequence, some of the equilibria in the 
economy can be ruled out. 
 
In the analysis that follows, we apply these ideas to the multiplicity of equilibria in 
Shleifer’s model of implementation cycles. His framework is particularly 
appropriate for looking at the role of information assumptions in macroeconomics, 
since the cyclical equilibria rely on expectations about expectations. 
 
In Shleifer's model, the rate of technological progress is a known constant. In the 
analysis that follows we demonstrate that, if there is uncertainty about the rate of 
technological progress, and if signals about this variable are correlated across 
agents, then agents will coordinate on a single equilibrium. Under relatively general 
conditions, immediate implementation is the only undominated strategy for firms. 
According to this result, it would never be profitable for firms to delay the 
implementation of their innovations. The potential relevance to the New Economy 
period should be clear. The uncertainty about the trend growth rate, by encouraging 
firms to implement immediately rather than delay, could eliminate implementation 
cycles and be associated with a sustained expansion.   17
 
The intuition for our results can be summarized as follows. Suppose that we are in a 
situation where the fundamentals of the economy are only consistent with 
immediate implementation, and this is the dominant strategy for firms. Suppose 
now that the fundamentals change slightly, and that immediate implementation is 
only "almost" dominant. Firms might choose to delay the implementation of their 
innovations. Yet, if there is some noise about the fundamentals, and if agents are 
uncertain regarding the beliefs of the other agents in the economy, delaying the 
implementation is a riskier strategy than immediate implementation. Firms will 
therefore tend to implement immediately. 
 
More generally, the optimal strategy depends on what other firms will do in nearby 
states of the world, including those in which immediate implementation is a 
dominant strategy. Taking these into account, the ex ante dominant strategy is not to 
wait for a boom. The logic applies even to circumstances in which the fundamentals 
of the economy are not close to making immediate implementation "almost” 
dominant, as we clarify below. 
 
4.  The basic setup 
 
The basic structure of the model is identical to Shleifer (1986), and we refer the 
reader to that paper for full details. Briefly, an infinitely-lived representative 
consumer maximizes utility: 
 





























where 0<ρ<1 is the subjective discount factor,  1 0 < ≤γ
 
indexes the extent of relative 
risk aversion, xtj is the consumption of good j in period t,  N is the number of  18
commodities, and λ≡1/N, where N is a large number. The lifetime budget constraint 
of the representative agent is: 
 
(2)       
yp x
D














where ptj is the price of commodity j in period t, yt is income, and Dt = (1+r1)... (1+rt) is 
the inverse of the discount factor, where 1+rt is the rate of interest paid in period t+1 





tj tj t x p c
1
. 
The structure of preferences implies constant expenditure shares: 
 
(3)   px c tj tj t    = λ  
 
No storage technology is assumed to exist:  hence, ct =yt and the consumer is neither 
a borrower nor a saver. As in Shleifer (1986), the equilibrium interest rate is: 
 
























































Let Πt  be aggregate profits. Labor is inelastically supplied at L. A unit of labor is the 
numeraire and so the wage rate is normalized to unity. The income identity is then 
given by: 
 
(5)   yt = Πt + L 
 
There are N ordered sectors in the economy. In the first period, one firm in each of 
the sectors 1, 2,..., n generates an invention (so there are n inventions in the first  19
period). In the second period, one firm in each of the sectors n+1, n+2,..., 2n generates 
an invention. In period T*=mod(N/n), one firm in each of the sectors (T*−1)⋅n+1, 
(T*−1)⋅n+2, ..., T*⋅n generates an invention, and so forth. An invention in period t 
enables firms to produce output using a fraction 1/µ of the labor input which was 
previously required, where µ > 1 is the rate of technical progress. It is this rate that 
we will consider to be uncertain in the analysis of the next section. 
 
Firms that invent can implement immediately or delay. When a firm implements its 
invention, it becomes a monopolistic supplier in its sector. Its profits are 
 
(6)   t t y m⋅ = π  
 
where  ) / 1 1 ( µ λ − ≡ m . In the period following the implementation, imitators enter 
the market and drive the profits of the innovating firm down to zero. Hence, firms 
have an incentive to maximize the short-run returns from implementing the 
innovation. They will trade off the opportunity cost of delaying the innovation to the 
future against the potential gain from implementing during a period of high 
aggregate demand. 
 
Let 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 be the fraction of the n firms receiving an invention at time t = 1, .. , T-1 













i T T α β  so that  n T ⋅ β  denotes the 
number of firms that implement at time T: those who received an invention during 
the cycle and waited, and those who received an invention at time T. Note that 
1 = T β  when all firms implement immediately and  T T = β  when they all wait until 
time T. 
 
Cycles of period T≤T* are an equilibrium if and only if  1 1 π π > − T T D , or 
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Note that equation (7) collapses to Shleifer’s equation (12) - 
() 1 1 ) (
1 1 > − ≡
− − γ ρ nTm T f
T  - if  T π  and  1 − T D  are computed on the assumption that 
everybody believes that everybody else will invest at T, that is, 
0 ... 1 2 1 = = = = − T α α α  and  T T = β .  
 
By investigating the left-hand-side of equation (7) we can make a number of useful 
observations about the degree of coordination required to sustain a T-boom 
equilibrium. 
 
First, if α1 =1 and βT  = 2 the LHS is always smaller than 1 (using Shleifer’s condition 
(14), p. 1173) and so cycles (of size T=2 or more) are not possible.  
 
Even if α1 < 1  the LHS is often smaller than 1. More specifically:  







t α decreases, and 







t α the LHS decreases when T increases. 
That is, the longer the T−boom the larger the number of firms that must wait before 
















. In other words, a T−boom can be supported as a Nash equilibrium if and 
only if at least a fraction k of the n(T-1) firms receiving an innovation at periods  21
1,...,T−1 wait. The precise value of k will depend on the parameters of the model, 
and from now on we will restrict attention to the case where k is greater than ½.6 
 
5.  Extending the basic model 
 
Unlike Shleifer (1986), we assume that the rate of technical progress µ  is not known 
to firms. Instead, they receive a noisy signal of µ , and hence a noisy signal of m. The 
real values of µ and m are fixed in periods 1 to T*. In period T*+1 new values are 
drawn which are independent of the values in the previous periods, and again at 
period 2T*+1 and so on. Shleifer’s model does not allow for cycles that are longer 
than T* (see p. 1173 of his paper). Hence the decision of firms whether to implement 
or delay is made independently every time they receive an innovation, and is 
independent of past realizations. We write m as the real value for the current T* 
periods we are in and focus on firms’ decisions to wait or not within this length of 
time. 
 
Since the rate of technical progress is no longer common knowledge, this means that 
firms are uncertain about the function f(T) in (7). To be more precise, firms observe 
the noisy signal mit = m + xit , where xit are continuous random variables independent 
of each other with support xit∈(-ε, ε), E(xit)=0 i=1,2,…,N, t = 1,2,...,T* . These can be 
quite general - the only relevant property of xit we need is that the xit’s  are 




) ( , = < m m P t i   
 
∀ i ∈ {1, 2, …, N} and ∀ t ∈ {1, 2, …, T*}.  
 
A pure strategy for firm i in this model is a mapping, sit(mit) where 
} ,..., 2 , 1 { ) , ( :
* T m m sit → + − ε ε  and where 1 = immediate implementation, 2 = 
                                                           
6 This is not unduly restrictive. Numerical simulations suggest that k is substantially higher, around ¾,  22
implementation after delaying one period, etc. The vector of firms’ strategies at time 
t is denoted by st = (s1t,s2t,…,sNt), s-it = (s1t,…,si-1,t,si+1,t,…,sNt).  
 
Denote by M the set of all values of m for which f(T)<1 for T=2…,T*.7 Let m’ be the 
infimum of the set M. Let m* = m’ - ε. For a firm which – given its signal – knows that 
m < m*, immediate implementation is the dominant strategy. To see why, note that 
equation (7) is computed under the most favorable conditions for waiting:  both Π1 
and ΠT are computed under the assumption that all other firms wait. (By ‘all other 
firms’, we mean all other firms that have already generated an innovation and can 
therefore choose to implement now or later.) 
 
If m < m* the strategy “implement immediately” yields a higher payoff than the 
strategy “wait”, even if everybody else waits for the T-boom. Since in Shleifer’s 
model payoffs are proportional to output, while the discount factor is proportional 
to output raised by γ, then if any number of firms choose not to wait for a T-boom, 
Π1 will increase, while ΠT/DT-1 will decrease. In other words, the payoff from waiting 
decreases and the payoff from implementing immediately increases. Thus when m < 
m* the strategy “implement immediately” yields a higher payoff than the strategy 
“wait” regardless of the choices of other firms. This shows that immediate 
implementation is the dominant strategy when m < m*. 
 
Since the noise is bounded by ε a firm receiving a signal mit < m* knows for sure that 
m < m*.  The firm will therefore implement immediately.8 Using our notation, we can 
therefore say that sit(mit) = 1 for mit < m*, because this is a dominant strategy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
for many parameter values that satisfy Shleifer’s parameter restrictions. 
7 In fact, in many cases it is sufficient that f(2)<1 for this to hold. See Figure 2, page 1176 in Shleifer and 
the discussion found there. 
8 I n a o ne - s ho t  gam e  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e nt  t hat  mit<m’ because the firm’s signal is the best predictor of m 
(because the noise is symmetric). In our setting, however, firms receive repeated signals. Their posterior 
belief of what the real value of m is will therefore shrink with probability one. This is why we use m’-ε 
as the bound under which we can say for certain that firms will never delay implementing their 
invention.  23
However, for m ≥ m* longer cycles, or T-booms (T = 2, 3, …, T*) can also be sustained 
as a Nash Equilibrium, and it is this range of parameter values which is the focus of 
Shleifer’s model and ours. We now show that when noise is introduced into the 
model Shleifer’s result no longer holds: 
 
Proposition.    In the implementation cycle model with noisy signals, the only 
possible equilibrium is one with immediate implementation. 
 
Proof.  By contradiction: Assume that there exists m ~  ≥ m* and a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium S where any firm i receiving an invention at time t and a signal  m mi
~ ≥  
delays its implementation until time T>1. 
 
Denote by  ) , ( i it i s m − φ  the probability firm i attaches to the event that more than 
kn⋅(T−1) firms that receive innovations at periods 1,..,T−1 wait for a T−boom, when 
its own signal is mit and their equilibrium strategies are s-i. 
 
Lemma.  ) , ( i it i s m − φ >0 
 
Proof.    This result is intuitive since S is − by assumption − an equilibrium. A 
formal proof is provided in Appendix 2. 
 
However,  ) , ~ ( i i S m − φ  which is the probability that at least a fraction k of the n⋅ (T-1) 
firms who receive innovations in periods 1,…,T−1 are waiting for a T−boom cannot 
exceed the probability that at least a fraction k of these firms receive a signal > m ~  
because firms which receive a signal mj <m ~  implement immediately (because it is a 
dominant strategy). 
 
The probability that firm i attaches to the event that any of the other firm receives a 
signal >  ~ m is ½ by (8). The probability that at least kn(T−1) firms received such a  24












  which converges to zero as n increases for a fixed k > ½  














which essentially is a step function which is equal to 1 for k < ½ and 0 for k > ½). 
Throughout Shleifer’s paper it is assumed that n is large and so the limit applies. We 
therefore get a contradiction with our lemma 1: so m ~  cannot be larger than m*, that 
is, no cycles of length T>1 are possible in equilibrium, and the proposition is proved. 
This result shows the sensitivity of the existence of cycles in the Shleifer (1986) 




In this paper, we have drawn attention to the contrast between the New Economy 
boom of the 1990s and previous cyclical fluctuations. We argue that this contrast can 
be explained using Shleifer’s model of implementation cycles. In the first part of the 
paper, we present some indirect evidence in support of Shleifer’s model. For 
example, the co-movements of initial public offerings and MFP growth are 
consistent with innovations that are implemented in waves. The association between 
these two proxies for innovation is quite strong: lagged IPOs help to predict MFP 
growth, even conditional on lagged MFP growth.  
 
The 1990s, however, clearly saw a decline in the volatility of productivity growth. 
There was a corresponding decline in the volatility of IPOs. Given the similar 
patterns shown by the two series, we argue that implementation cycles may have 
weakened in the 1990s.  Again, we interpret this in terms of Shleifer’s model: instead 
of strategic delays, immediate implementation may have emerged as the 
equilibrium outcome. 
  25
Our theoretical contribution, the second part of the paper, explains this development 
in the following terms. Recall that, in Shleifer’s model, the timing of implementation 
of innovations is related to firms’ expectations about future aggregate income. These 
expectations are self-fulfilling, and business cycles are driven by strategic delays 
supported by particular expectations. But when we extend Shleifer’s model to 
incorporate uncertainty about the trend growth rate of the economy, the equilibria 
with delayed implementation are eliminated, because delay becomes risky. Business 
cycles with delayed implementation therefore rely on a strong common knowledge 
assumption, one that may not have been satisfied in the unusual circumstances of 
the 1990s. We argue that this could explain the reduced volatility in MFP growth 
and IPOs: uncertainty about the trend growth rate led to immediate implementation 
as the sole equilibrium outcome. 
 
Although previous researchers have demonstrated the importance of informational 
assumptions for multiplicity, we have shown that similar arguments apply to a 
classic model of the business cycle. More ambitiously, we believe that our analysis 
could shed new light on the dynamics of the New Economy in the USA during the 
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Appendix 1.  Data sources 
 
Number of IPOs in USA, Updated data on IPOs collected by Jay Ritter, downloaded 
from website http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/publ_papers/IPOALL.xls on 4 May 2004. 
 
MFP for private nonfarm business sector: series MPU750023(K), downloaded from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics website 29 June 2004. 
 
MFP for manufacturing, durables (SIC codes 24-25, 32-39): series MPU320003(B), 
downloaded from BLS website 29 June 2004. 
 
MFP for manufacturing, non-durables (SIC codes 20-23,26-31): series MPU310003(B), 
downloaded from BLS website 29 June 2004. 
 
 
Appendix 2.  Proof of Lemma. 
 
 
Let 0 ≤ j ≤  n⋅ (T-1) denote the total number of firms who receive innovations at 
periods 1,..,T-1 and wait until period T before implementing. Let ΠT/DT-1(j) and Π1(j) 
denote the payoffs from delaying until time T and implementing immediately 
(respectively) given that exactly j firms wait.  
 
Since (by assumption) S is an equilibrium then the ex-post payoff to the firm from 
waiting must be higher than that of implementing immediately:  
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Note that all the expressions in the square brackets – on both sides of the equation – 
are positive because ΠT/DT-1(j) > Π1(j) when j>k⋅n⋅ (T-1) and ΠT/DT-1(j) < Π1(j) 
otherwise. 
 
Furthermore, the quantity ΠT/DT-1(j)-Π1(j) increases with j (and conversely Π1(j) -
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